Zcash Agora

Compared with the coinholder stack

The two systems answer different questions: what the coins want, and what the people want. The same questions can be put to both. Each claim about the coinholder stack links to the sentence it rests on in the draft ZIPs or the published configuration.

Who is involved

Coinholder voting

Your wallet Orchard ZEC at the snapshot 16 shares, each to 7 of 14 One committee: 14 Zcash organizations the same servers, three roles at once Role 1 · the submission servers receive your shares, see your IP and your choice Role 2 · the key holders the election authority: any 8 of 14 open the amounts Role 3 · the validators run the vote chain, decide what enters it and the tally one of them is the poll runner: snapshot roots, genesis, signed round config The vote chain their public record: choices, encrypted amounts, tally 3 PIR servers see your IP 8 of the 14 colluding wear all three hats at once
  • Your wallet proves it held Orchard ZEC at a snapshot block and votes with that weight.
  • One committee of 14 Zcash organizations does three jobs at once. It receives your shares and sees your IP and your choice. It holds the key that opens the amounts, any 8 of 14. It runs the vote chain and the tally.
  • The poll runner is one of them. It picks the snapshot and signs the round that wallets accept.
  • 3 PIR servers, run by the same organizations, see who takes part.
  • The vote chain is the committee's public record.

Zcash Agora

Issuing state signed your passport cannot spot it in the log TACEO network salts the passport's number 2 of 3 operators · sees it blinded signature blinded query drand the clock · not Zcash · read only Bitcoin timestamps read only Your phone passport stays on it; browser proves & seals 3 public Nostr relays not ours · see your IP and a sealed envelope The ledger one server, ours verifies, signs receipts no key, no IP Public log on GitHub everything, forever Anyone recounts in the browser reads nobody of ours holds a key or sees an address
  • Your phone runs the ZKPassport app. Your browser proves you are on the list and seals your ballot to the closing time.
  • The state that issued your passport signed it; that signature is what the proof checks. The TACEO network, a few independent operators, salts the passport's number so that the state cannot recognize it in the log.
  • 3 public Nostr relays, run by others, carry your messages. They see your IP, as any relay does.
  • The ledger, our one server, reads the relays, checks every proof and appends to the log. It never talks to a voter.
  • The public log, a git repository, holds every registration, ballot, refusal and tally.
  • drand and Bitcoin are only read. One opens the ballots, the other dates the log.

Six questions, both answers

1. Who can read my ballot before the close?

Coinholder voting

Your choice is never sealed. It is a public input, visible on chain and to every server that handles your shares. Your amount is encrypted to a key that any 8 of the 14 organizations can rebuild.

Zcash Agora

Nobody, including us. The ballot is encrypted to a future round of the drand clock. The key is that round's signature, and it does not exist before the close. The round is made by Cloudflare, EPFL, Kudelski and others who have nothing to do with Zcash.

The key: 8 of 14 Zcash organizations each with a stake in the outcome 8 together open every amount, any time, now or later The key: a drand round made by parties outside Zcash, at the closing time, public for everyone the moment it exists

2. If that threshold is broken, what do they learn about my choice?

Coinholder voting

Nothing new. The choice was public from the start. The ZIP considered encrypting it and declined, for circuit cost.

Zcash Agora

They could open the ballots early. They would learn what everyone learns at the close: a choice under a pseudonym that links to no passport and no address.

3. If that threshold is broken, what do they learn about my coin holdings?

Coinholder voting

Your exact balance. It is cut into 16 encrypted shares. Each share goes to 7 of the 14 servers, and the servers are the key holders themselves. So any 8 of them hold every share of every voter and the key that opens them. The balance of a shielded user is the one number Zcash exists to hide.

Zcash Agora

Nothing. Your holdings are never asked, proven or encrypted. A ballot is a choice and nothing else.

1 · your balance, cut in 16 16 encrypted pieces of the amount 2 · each share goes to 7 of the 14 servers 8 colluding (amber) · 6 honest (white) 7 copies cannot all land on the 6 honest ones 3 · so the 8 hold every one of your 16 shares and the same 8 hold the key that opens them = your exact balance, for every voter

4. What do they know about my IP address?

Coinholder voting

A validator sees your IP and the timing of every transaction it receives. It is also a submission server, so one bad node pairs your IP with your choice. If 8 collude, they hold your IP, your choice and your balance together.

Zcash Agora

The relay you post to sees your IP and a sealed envelope. Our ledger reads the relays and never sees your address. One bad relay can pair your IP with your choice at the close, but not with your passport, which went to a different relay. Tor or a VPN removes even that.

your wallet a validator IP · choice · key share one party, all three your browser relay: IP + envelope reads ledger: no IP no party has IP and key

5. What stops someone from voting twice?

Coinholder voting

On the vote chain, nullifiers stop the same note voting twice. Whether a note was still unspent at the snapshot is another matter. That is proven against a root that the poll runner supplies, and nothing in the protocol checks it against Zcash. A script exists to check it. Anyone can run it, and nobody has to.

Zcash Agora

One passport, one registration: the log refuses a second registration with the same passport number. One registration, one ballot: the log refuses a second ballot under the same pseudonym. Both rules are checked again by anyone who recounts. What it does not stop: a state can issue passports to people who do not exist, and a person can lend theirs for money. Each extra vote takes another passport.

6. Can I recount the result myself?

Coinholder voting

You can check it, not produce it. A command verifies the validators' partial decryptions, if you run a node of your own. Without 8 validators there is no tally at all.

Zcash Agora

Yes, with no key and no permission. Your browser re-checks every proof, opens every ballot with the public drand round, and counts. If we vanished, the count would still come out.

Scope