Compared with the coinholder stack
The two systems answer different questions: what the coins want, and what the people want. The same questions can be put to both. Each claim about the coinholder stack links to the sentence it rests on in the draft ZIPs or the published configuration.
Who is involved
Coinholder voting
- Your wallet proves it held Orchard ZEC at a snapshot block and votes with that weight.
- One committee of 14 Zcash organizations does three jobs at once. It receives your shares and sees your IP and your choice. It holds the key that opens the amounts, any 8 of 14. It runs the vote chain and the tally.
- The poll runner is one of them. It picks the snapshot and signs the round that wallets accept.
- 3 PIR servers, run by the same organizations, see who takes part.
- The vote chain is the committee's public record.
Zcash Agora
- Your phone runs the ZKPassport app. Your browser proves you are on the list and seals your ballot to the closing time.
- The state that issued your passport signed it; that signature is what the proof checks. The TACEO network, a few independent operators, salts the passport's number so that the state cannot recognize it in the log.
- 3 public Nostr relays, run by others, carry your messages. They see your IP, as any relay does.
- The ledger, our one server, reads the relays, checks every proof and appends to the log. It never talks to a voter.
- The public log, a git repository, holds every registration, ballot, refusal and tally.
- drand and Bitcoin are only read. One opens the ballots, the other dates the log.
Six questions, both answers
1. Who can read my ballot before the close?
Coinholder voting
Your choice is never sealed. It is a public input, visible on chain and to every server that handles your shares. Your amount is encrypted to a key that any 8 of the 14 organizations can rebuild.
Zcash Agora
Nobody, including us. The ballot is encrypted to a future round of the drand clock. The key is that round's signature, and it does not exist before the close. The round is made by Cloudflare, EPFL, Kudelski and others who have nothing to do with Zcash.
2. If that threshold is broken, what do they learn about my choice?
Coinholder voting
Nothing new. The choice was public from the start. The ZIP considered encrypting it and declined, for circuit cost.
Zcash Agora
They could open the ballots early. They would learn what everyone learns at the close: a choice under a pseudonym that links to no passport and no address.
3. If that threshold is broken, what do they learn about my coin holdings?
Coinholder voting
Your exact balance. It is cut into 16 encrypted shares. Each share goes to 7 of the 14 servers, and the servers are the key holders themselves. So any 8 of them hold every share of every voter and the key that opens them. The balance of a shielded user is the one number Zcash exists to hide.
Zcash Agora
Nothing. Your holdings are never asked, proven or encrypted. A ballot is a choice and nothing else.
4. What do they know about my IP address?
Coinholder voting
A validator sees your IP and the timing of every transaction it receives. It is also a submission server, so one bad node pairs your IP with your choice. If 8 collude, they hold your IP, your choice and your balance together.
Zcash Agora
The relay you post to sees your IP and a sealed envelope. Our ledger reads the relays and never sees your address. One bad relay can pair your IP with your choice at the close, but not with your passport, which went to a different relay. Tor or a VPN removes even that.
5. What stops someone from voting twice?
Coinholder voting
On the vote chain, nullifiers stop the same note voting twice. Whether a note was still unspent at the snapshot is another matter. That is proven against a root that the poll runner supplies, and nothing in the protocol checks it against Zcash. A script exists to check it. Anyone can run it, and nobody has to.
Zcash Agora
One passport, one registration: the log refuses a second registration with the same passport number. One registration, one ballot: the log refuses a second ballot under the same pseudonym. Both rules are checked again by anyone who recounts. What it does not stop: a state can issue passports to people who do not exist, and a person can lend theirs for money. Each extra vote takes another passport.
6. Can I recount the result myself?
Coinholder voting
You can check it, not produce it. A command verifies the validators' partial decryptions, if you run a node of your own. Without 8 validators there is no tally at all.
Zcash Agora
Yes, with no key and no permission. Your browser re-checks every proof, opens every ballot with the public drand round, and counts. If we vanished, the count would still come out.
Scope
- This compares the two designs as published. It says nothing about what any operator has done.
- Agora's own leaks are on every page: a relay sees your address, registering takes a face match, and every ballot is readable at the close under its pseudonym.
- Corrections with a citation are welcome in the repository.